Understanding the Dynamics of Successful Islamic Insurgencies

In February 2006, I had just returned to Jerusalem from Ramallah. The US Department of Defense sent me to the Middle East to better understand how Iran cultivates “non-stated armed groups,” the 2006 term du jour for insurgencies. Hamas had just won the parliamentary election in January and was forming a new government. One of the key reasons I was sent over as the resident Iran expert for a counter terrorism think tank was that I predicted the outcome in the Fall of 2005.

My counterparts in the US Government, all neoconservatives and democratic peace theorists, did not agree. A Fatah representative going to graduate school with me at the time assured all that I was wrong. But I was not paying attention to American, Israeli, or European news sources (all the cool kids watched the BBC in the morning). I was watching and reading news from Turkey and Iran. A pattern was emerging. Iran was successfully exporting its Hezbollah model. It was literally exporting Jihad.

This article is a change of pace. Foreign policy is easy to ignore sometimes given the greater domestic debates, but it is an important topic for the South. So many of our young Southern men are in the military, it is important to take a look at other movements and strategic events to better understand what they are facing when they are deployed.

This piece is based on my life’s work. My career, with the exception of a brief hiatus from 2015 – 2017, has been to provide material support to the US military, the intelligence community, and its allies. Often, those allies were insurgency movements. Since 2002, I have traveled to seventy-eight countries. I have seen movements succeed and fail. I have witnessed unimaginable violence.

I celebrated among the Palestinian people when they took control of their destiny. I watched and warned about a small group of Kharijites in Northeast Syria gaining strength as early as 2007. The group had declared an Islamic State (a local Caliphate) in the early 8th Century. At that time, they were being supplied by Turkey to counter both the growing power of the rival Kurds, recently freed from the thumb of Saddam Hussein, and growing Iranian regional influence. I have had tea with Afghans, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs, discussing Islam and Nationalism.

In 2008, I met with men who took part in the execution of Romanian communist dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. Few recall the uprising in Romania began as Ceausescu departed for meetings in Iran. At the time, Muslims were beginning to stir in nearby Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, then Kosovo). Iran was already working to assist a Bosnian insurgency as the Yugoslav government and economy was falling apart in 1989. With Serbia on his border, the dictator needed to understand Iran’s intentions.

There are so many books that have been read. There are so many long flights into dangerous areas to recall. There are so many discussions over grilled lamb, chai, kumis, fresh herbs and cold vodka to retell. I still have some of the power points of debriefings I gave in Northern Virginia, Calgary, Bahrain, Djibouti, and Dubai. As recent tensions in Iran leads Hezbollah back toward the Lebanese-Israeli border, this is just one of the many subjects I have had to cover in the past.

Here are my five keys to successful Islamic Insurgencies.

The bricks of an Islamic Insurgency’s foundation are Ethnic Identity. All successful Islamic insurgencies are ethnocentric, not purely religiously inspired. Whether it was the Bosnians of 1995, Lebanese Shi’ites in 1982, the Pashto dominated Mujahedeen of the 1980s, or modern Yemeni rebels, every successful Islamic insurgency shares an ethnic glue. Shared ethnic identity, to include historical perceptions of subjugation, are a key to keeping these groups alive through the tough times.

When leaders are killed or material support is scarce, a shared ethnic bond keeps the group moving forward. The groups that fail or ultimately fizzle out are generally broadly based “Muslim” of some variety sect. Al Qaeda, for instance, which claims to seek a global caliphate, is too theologically obtuse for even the most ardent Salafist. Ethnic distinctions in Islamic insurgencies play a key role. Before an insurgency is cultivated, Iran will spend years, sometimes decades, building an ethnic identity before investing in an insurgency. They will support newspapers, online platforms, academic analyses – Tehran literally builds an intricate web of supporting evidence for a strategic ethnic identity. This, in turn, creates a shared foundation for a host of personnel needs as a movement progresses into a civil war.

The mortar of an Islamic Insurgency’s foundation are Religion. The other key component of a successful Islamic insurgency is obviously Islam. However, it is not just any ordinary variant of Islam that can suffice. Rather, states that seek to exploit ethnic grievances do so amongst shared religious identity groups and theology acts as a mortar to ethnic bricks. For instance, when Iran sought to exploit the vacuum of Lebanon, it chose marginalized Ismaili Shi’ites to create Hezbollah. The fact that Iran backed Shi’ites superficially seems like a no-brainer. However, Ismailism is a competitor to the Jafari School of Shi’ite Islam, which is the official faith of Iran and the majority of Iraq. Furthermore, Iran chose to back Hamas, a Sunni group, to achieve its objectives in Israel and Palestine.

This willingness to look past the specific theology while seeing its importance in the construction of an insurgency is crucial to strategic formation. Like ethnicity, a fundamental belief in religious purpose holds adherents together during the tough times. Secular insurgencies frequently collapse, especially when outside money dries up. Ethno-religious groups press on, regardless as to who or when they are getting paid. This has been true of such disparate groups as the Irish Republican Army and the Chechen rebels. A shared belief of generally accepted religious principles is key to the survivability of an insurgency, especially with Islamic groups.

The People’s investment in the Islamic Insurgency’s alternative vision is crucial. Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Syria are the five largest supporters of Islamic Insurgencies in the post-Gadhafi era. They all have a generally shared strategy for the cultivation of Islamic Insurgencies. It is not enough to be a group of tough guys. It is not enough to hail from the same ethno-religious group. It is not enough to shoot really well. The major supporters of Islamic Insurgency groups seek leaders who can convince the people that their alternative governing structure is better than the status quo.

Political leaders, motivational speakers, doctors, lawyers, school teachers, imams, construction workers… all are sought by the cultivating agents of these various state actors. They seek level-headed individuals. Sure, these folks will eventually yell, “Death to America!” or “Kill the Zionists!” but that is not until the person making such claims has the broader acceptance of the local populace AND the means to back it up. Yelling such statements prematurely and the individual is just another loudmouth on the streets of Sana. The real future leaders are cultivated with patience and discipline. In turn, they apply the same focus on the populace. It is a constant drip-drip-drip of feeding the constituency information that is negative about the status quo and positive about an alternative. Eventually, when the population demands a change, the infrastructure is standing readily by to say, “Hezbollah can give you the change you seek.” Until that time, while the Iranians or Saudis are prepping the ground work for change, they ensure strict discipline on those whom they are cultivating for a cause.

Fraternal societies play a key role in this phase. A great example of this is Nigerian Boko Haram. It has taken the Saudis almost two decades in a country that is half Muslim to build Boko Haram around the disaffected Muslim population of Northern Nigeria. It began as a Muslim brotherhood who attended militant madrassas. Although BH has been around since 2002, you probably had not heard of them until the past five years. Why? They have been spending their time building a Nationalist consensus that the status quo is wrong for the Nigerian people.

Parallel institutions are a core component of Islamic Insurgencies. Hezbollah has elected officials within the Lebanese Parliament. It also has hospitals, schools, news agencies, and other parallel institutions of social services that compete with the official government and international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs) like the UN Development Programme. The key to every successful Islamic Insurgency is not shooting their way into victory. It is not yelling loudest on a street corner regarding the virtues of Mohammed. It is building the people up to a point at which, once desiring an alternative to the status quo, an alternative is readily available. The poor are fed by Hamas. The Taliban offers law and order in a lawless environment. Children are given medical care by Hezbollah. Each group ensures that that the people not only know they are loved by the insurgency, they can rely upon them after they leave the current governing body.

Integrated command structures are carefully cultivated to maximize effect. There is a pattern of Islamic Insurgency management that can best be described as the Head, the Heart, and the Hands (3H). The head is usually someone who has the broader managerial gravitas to keep everything in motion. He is the chief diplomat. He is militarily astute, but not likely in charge of operations. He adjudicates internal disputes of importance. He sets the tone and keeps things going. However, unlike Western governments, the head is rarely known outside of a close knit circle. That is not specifically for his safety. It is generally known that enemy intelligence will identify the head. Rather, it is because the head of an Islamic Insurgency has a mission to achieve – full stop. He is not based upon some empty cult of personality. He is a talent, carefully cultivated and trained by senior state officials. He is the guy that can turn to Tehran and ask for five million dollars and get it – because they trust him.

The heart, by contrast, is a known figure. He is typically a religious leader, such as an Ayatollah or a highly regarded Imam. He inspires the masses with a combination of ethnic and religiously appealing discourse. He hammers home the benefits of the alternative offered by the Islamic Insurgency. He leads hundreds of content producers. In the 1970s, thousands of volunteers used cassette tapes to smuggle the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s message from France into Iran. Today, the use of podcasts, blogs, speeches, and a variety of multimedia are managed by the heart and his team. He stokes the emotional flames to revolt.

Finally, there is a third leader, who acts as the hands. He is the doer. Of the three leaders, he is the ground commander. He is making sure clean dishes are available at a food kitchen. He is ensuring his fighters are able to tactically execute. Like the head, the hand is little known outside of his men. His picture may be shared, but he does not do interviews. He is not on Facebook. He is not seeking notoriety. He is seeking operational proficiency to maximize effect. He is trusted to choose capable commanders for various tasks. The three leaders – intellectual, emotional, and physical – work in conjunction with one another, knowing that each has a crucial role for the strategic benefit of the other. The reason that the Israelis were never able to undermine Hezbollah as they did with Fatah and the PLO, is that these three are ideologically and ethno-religious leaders are joined at the hip, with a shared common strategic purpose. They love their people more than they love themselves. The same can be said for almost any other successful Islamic insurgency from Yemen and Somalia to Afghanistan. While other groups tend to collapse when a single personality either dies or is discredited, the 3H triumvirate of successful Islamic Insurgencies builds a cadre of leaders capable of stepping into their shoes, should they die because the cause is more important than the self.

These are the five patterns I have seen in every successful Islamic Insurgency. As Hezbollah begins to increase its military operations against Israel, I had to give pause to my other writings to reexamine this professional passion of mine. Things are heating up around the world. That is natural during an American Presidential year. Islamic Insurgencies contribute to a global strategic framework. Knowing why some succeed is just as important as knowing why they are deployed.

One last thought, before you go: ISIS.

The Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS), despite significant material support from Turkey, Israel, and the United States (especially in its early days), was highly successful before it spectacularly failed. Why?
First, ISIS never invested in the populations outside of its original Kharijite community. With each territorial conquest, ISIS provided no positive alternative to the preceding status quo. Rather, it focused on raping and pillaging the locales within which it entered, then imposed its own laws. Despite claiming to be true Islamic liberators, they acted as conquerors and then occupiers.

Second, ISIS provided some but very little of the institutional support upon which citizens rely. Despite extraordinary wealth from captured oil fields, it chose not to disseminate a parallel state apparatus. The citizens that make insurgencies last, began to flee.

Finally, the organization degenerated from a capable and invested leadership perspective. ISIS revolves around a cult of personality in the form of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This limited the capacity to cultivate future senior leaders. Even today, as men show promise, they are viewed as competitors to al-Baghdadi, not potential contributors to their people. Additionally, the lack of clarity of purpose or cause amongst ISIS leaders invited a situation by which violent rapists, murderers, and thugs ascended to levels of power to the detriment of tactical capability.

Although many top commanders were killed by allied military strikes, the majority of tactical leaders were killed by ISIS tribunals. The smart military commanders who lead the original conquests of regional cities in Iraq and Syria were replaced by thugs who eventually schemed and muscled their way into positions of power. These thugs often used unsubstantiated claims of theological insufficiency to get those talented officers executed, often by competitors to the same commands. Today, many of the ground commanders of ISIS are drug addicted Northern transplants from European prisons who have tattoos on their necks and faces. As a consequences, they are losing everywhere they fight and have long since lost the love of the people. ISIS is an example of what not to do when building a viable Islamic Insurgency.

As attacks increase, or I see more activity on a global military scale, I hope to weigh-in on future global security matters, especially since so many young Southern boys are serving as American janissaries in never-ending wars. It will be a busy twelve-to-fifteen months. For the sake of our young men, we should be aware of the challenges they face as they march off to battle on behalf of Wall Street, Hollywood, Israel, and other fat cats who view them as expandable blood bags.

Please pray for their safety.