Poblachtánachas Éireannach: Nationalist Lessons from the Irish, Part I

It is time for Southern Nationalists to adopt the strategies and tactics of successful Nationalist movements.  Neither the National Socialists of Germany nor the Fascists of Italy offer an answer to the solution of Southern independence.  Afterall, they failed.  The Irish, however, the genetic and cultural kin of the South, offer a far better template for long term, Southern freedom – and unlike their German or Italian counterparts, they actually beat the British.

This series is not about the Irish Republican Army – original, provisional, “real” or otherwise.  The IRA is a manifestation of Irish Nationalism, not the cause of it.  Nor is this piece about Catholic-Nationalist versus Protestant-Unionist or Loyalist divisions.  Such religious distinctions played almost no role in the eventual settlement of an Irish Free State.  Protestants played a crucial role in the fight for Irish freedom at a time that such independence was condemned and denounced by the Catholic Church.  Rather, this piece is part of a larger study on successful Nationalist movements and what is needed to realize Southern independence on a state by state basis.

The Irish model is the best model suited for Dixie.  For those who mock Southern freedom as a lost cause, I say this: Ireland lost sixteen previous attempts to free itself of British rule before succeeding in secession; the South has only tried once.  How the Irish eventually succeeded when previous attempts failed is crucial in order to ensure the South’s next push for independence is a success.

One excuse for the success of the Irish revolt is that the Irish exploited World War I.  That is not true.  The Irish War of Independence started after the British won World War I, in 1919.  The Easter Rising of 1916 was a quickly suppressed disaster.  The (original) IRA did not present a manifesto until the Summer of 1918, after the German Spring Counteroffensive failed and the first American troops were now committed to victory on the continent.  Thus, with the luxury of bringing battle hardened British troops to Ireland, the British still lost to a rabble of mostly self-taught Irish farmers and part time freedom fighters.  The development of Tom Barry’s Irish “Flying Column” and Michael Collin’s “Squad” did not occur in a vacuum.  They were built out of necessity to achieve independence and they sprung from the large body of Irish people who had been groomed to seek independence.  

All successful Nationalist movements begin with a total investment in “identitarianism” and the Irish are no different.  In the book, Irish Nationalists and the Making of the Irish Race, by Bruce Nelson, the author describes the great pains to which early Irish revolutionaries built a consensus for a unique identity that was worthy of freedom.  No military struggle could exist without the will of the people and that was not a foregone conclusion as late as 1905 when Sinn Fein (“Ourselves Alone”) was founded.  Controlling the more militant elements of independence was crucial for Sinn Fein’s founder, Arthur Griffith, until the Irish People were ready:

“Although Griffith was not a pacifist, and Sinn Fein included ‘physical force’ nationalists, the organization quickly evolved toward a reliance on ‘passive resistance’ and became, for many observers, a middle way between the cravenness of the Irish Party and the Fenians’ insistence on the necessity of violence.  But for Griffith… the fundamental issue was the character of the Irish People, the recovery of their self-respect, and the building up of their capacity for self-reliance.” (Pg. 183)

Does one really believe that the South is ready for independence when her own people wear tee-shirts emblazoned with the flag of her oppressor, disproportionately serve the military interests of her Wall Street despots, and often confuse caricatures of her culture as genuine examples of her own people?  Of course not.  The South is more than fried chicken, moonshine, and ‘Merica.  She needs to see that, just like the Irish needed to see that they were more than just a bunch of drunk, fighting, potato monkeys.

[Author’s Note: I love to drink, fight, and eat potatoes – but it does not define me or my kin.]

Overcoming mental, psychological, and emotional hurdles to independence are difficult.  The seeds of Irish independence were sown over generations of Irish Nationalists building a Nationalist consensus.  An investment in Irish independence from English occupation and oppression required Irish Nationalists to break an obscure mentality of their own people.  It is hard to fathom now, but at the turn of the 20^th century, Irish citizens fought dutifully for the British Crown in disproportionate numbers.   While simultaneously remaining the subject of Anglo ridicule and hating the very crown for which they willingly gave their lives to defend, the Irish yielded the second largest number of recipients of the Victoria Cross (the UK’s version of the Medal of Honor) after only the English themselves.  Proportionately, the Irish gave more of her native sons to the British Empire than the English.   That love-hate relationship with a government that loathes its most loyal fighting citizenry should be familiar to Southerners.

Beginning in the mid-19^th Century, Irish Nationalists began building a network designed to sell the Irish on the notion that independence was in their personal best interest.  This was very apparent during the Famine years of the late 1840s, but emigration and death were more immediate matters that had to be addressed.  Still, Irish Nationalists used the Irish Famine as a rallying point at which degradation at the hands of their British oppressors was effectively exploited by a core group who made a simple, but effective argument: This would not have happened if we ruled ourselves.

By the close of the 19^th Century, Irish Nationalists opened Irish language schools, Irish newspapers, Irish businesses, and promoted Irish cultural icons and heroes.  Irish history and legends played a crucial role in building Irish Nationalism.  Seumas MacManus’ book, The Story of the Irish Race, was published by the Irish Publishing Company in 1921, but excerpts of his work were floated around Ireland ten years earlier.  Today, nearly every Irish home has a copy of that book – with its extraordinary combination of myths and facts.  My mother raised me reading legends from it.

Irish Nationalists knew, if they wanted secession from Great Britain to succeed they needed to invest in the Irish people before anything else could be possible.  It is also important to recognize that this was done despite a lack of political or financial capital.  

The centers of power in Ireland were firmly enjoyed by those hostile toward Irish Nationalism.  The mainstream media outlets of the day fabricated Irish Nationalist outrages to inspire disdain toward Irish Nationalism (O’Malley, pg 320-21).  The banks were firmly in British control.  The Irish had to find creative ways to make money on their own and then use those funds to bypass the lock on communications enjoyed by the British. This was especially true of those who might be identified as Irish Nationalists by Unionist sympathizers.  To express a sympathy toward Irish Nationalism would get someone fired from their employment in pre-1916 Dublin.  In the lead up to the Easter Rising, Irish Nationalists identified by their own family members in some cases, would frequently hear from their employers, “Sorry, I share some of your same sympathies, but I do not want any trouble – I have to let you go.”  

Sound familiar?

Ernie O’Malley’s book, On Another Man’s Wound, gives us the greatest insight into the struggles of the early fight for independence in Ireland and the subsequent challenges to maintain the fight.  O’Malley’s fantastic autobiographical account on the Irish War of Independence covers his transition from privileged youth to a runner and gunman who traveled throughout Ireland organizing attacks with Flying Columns.  O’Malley’s brother, Frank, is a prime example of the split loyalties of the Irish people that would eventually be overcome through Nationalist Identitarian investment.  Frank was an officer in the British Army who served at the front during World War I.  As a boy, this same brother would also pretend to fight the British Sassenachs (a derogatory term for English outsiders; pg 19).  If this seems ironic, consider this:  how many Southern boys grew up pretending to be Confederates killing Yankee invaders only to eventually join the Yankee army?  

O’Malley details the the disdain that the Irish in Dublin felt toward the Irish fighters of the Easter Rising (pg 31), to include his family, and how that disdain turned into sympathy (pg 47) and eventual support (Chapter Six).  Again, this is a manifestation of a concerted effort to build Irish National identity as unique and valuable.  The more oppressive the British became in their quest to suppress an Irish rebellion, the more the Irish people sympathized with the cause of Irish independence.

Irish Nationalism also had significant military importance. The most successful Flying Columns were found in areas of Ireland with a strong sense of Irish Nationalist investment.  O’Malley had major praise for Cork and Kerry’s fighting acumen and mission discipline.  These two counties that form the Irish South were far enough away from strong British cultural influences and consequently, the investment into Irish Nationalism in that region enjoyed positive yields.  The areas that were less effective were the suburban areas just outside of Dublin with less vigor for fighting.

Whereas it is often exciting to discuss the militant aspects of revolutionary movements, the Irish Nationalist success is grounded upon the less exciting investment in creating a freedom zeitgeist.  Blowing up cars did not win Irish freedom; making the Irish people investors in the success of her own freedom, did.  In fact, going back to O’Malley’s book, he mentions that the fight in the North began to take on a distinctive religious tone.  Given the importance of Ireland’s Presbyterian community toward Irish independence in the South, the fact that Irish Presbyterians in the North were somehow lumped in a Protestant-versus-Catholic struggle surprised the Irish Republican commanders in Dublin.  Again, however, this appears to be an oversight on the part of early Irish Nationalist investments in the heavily settled Scots-Irish North.  Simply put, it appears that Irish Nationalists failed to embrace and cultivate Gaelic unity with their Scots-Irish colleagues and the consequence of that failure remains to this day.  Regardless, such an oversight needs to be understood as Southern Nationalists seek to build a freedom consensus from Texas to Florida and up through Virginia.

Of course, no discussion on Irish freedom can be complete without some reference to Eamon De Valera.  “Dev,” as he was called by his peers, was an American of maternal Irish and paternal Basque lineage.  De Valera would become Ireland’s Prime Minister and lead the country for decades after nearly splitting it apart in a post-Free State Civil War.  Yet, despite being an American, he understood the role of Irish Nationalism in the formation of revolutionary zeal.  “As the struggle in Ireland grew more bloody by the day (1920), de Valera also resorted to a quite different discourse – of the Irish as a unique people.” (Nelson, pg. 231).  

The Southern Nationalist must invest in the South as a unique people if it is to achieve Southern independence.  

In conclusion, as we exit Easter Week, a celebration of the sacrifice and conquest of death by our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, we – the global Irish community – celebrate another Easter related sacrifice: the Easter Rising of 1916 and the Irish Nationalist martyrs who gave their lives for a bigger cause.  Despite its initial failure, the Easter Rising (or Rebellion) planted the final seed of a Nationalist War of Independence that ultimately culminated in an Irish Free State six years later.  After hundreds of years of English rule beginning in 1171, the Irish would attain freedom.  

But the Easter Rising was not an isolated event.  It did not succeed in its initial objective.  It was, in fact, highly unpopular among the long beaten Irish citizenry when it was launched and crushed quickly.  Still, it is the one event by which many of the Irish turn toward historically as the beginning of the end of Irish suppression.  They are wrong.

The march toward Irish independence began well before the capture and subsequent surrender of the General Post Office in Dublin.  It began with Irish Identitarian investments in the early 1800s.  The same Nationalist consensus building must form the bricks of Southern Independence, built upon a righteous and Godly foundation.   Only then can Southern independence be fully achieved.

In Part II of this series, I will cover the military and organizational challenges faced by the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence, the lessons they learned, and how they overcame them to achieve victory.